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to attempt delegation of nondelegable duties. But surely this is not the end of
the matter. What role, if any, does the Court have to play in the creation of
such responsible citizenship, given the institutional development which has
actually occurred during a century and a half? It is not difficult to suggest
areas where vigorous defense of individual rights by the Court seems to have
encouraged intelligent political response, rather than the contrary. The cases
involving judicial supervision of state criminal procedures under the Fourteenth
Amendment, of which Justice Jackson was generally critical, may provide one
example. The doctrines which have so spectacularly developed in the field may
be criticized for the tensions created and for their numerous irrationalities. And
yet it is demonstrable that in many particular situations, the Court has opened
the way to sensible local legislative action by identifying and dramatizing prob-
lems which tend to become submerged and obscured in the welter of public
issues confronting any modern legislature. Conceding that the Court has a
limited role to play in the preservation of our political values, may it not be
true, however, that, in the situation which actually confronts us, it is an in-
dispensable role? These are intriguing questions. One might wish that Mr.
Justice Jackson had given them more explicit consideration.
FRANcrs A. ALLEN*
* Professor of Law in Harvard University.
The Communist Theory of Law. By Hans Kelsen. New York: Frederick A.
Praeger, Inc., 1955. Pp. viii, 203. $5.00.
Few Western legal theories have been more strongly criticized by Soviet
jurists than that of the so-called pure theory of law. It is, therefore, quite fitting
that Hans Kelsen, the founder and leading advocate of that theory, should now
see fit to write this acute analysis of Communist theories of law. Dr. Kelsen, at
the outset, frankly confesses his own ignorance of the Russian language; his
work is based upon German, French, and English translations of the works of
leading Soviet writers. It cannot be denied that this dependence upon trans-
lated material makes the basis for the Kelsen study far from adequate from a
theoretical point. of view. At the same time, in this reviewer's opinion, it is far
more preferable to have this study upon Kelsen's terms than not to have it at
all. Certainly, it is more fruitful to have Kelsen devote his juristic genius to
translations of Soviet writers than to have a second-rate jurist, who happens to
possess the necessary linguistic knowledge, do a similar job upon the Russian
originals.
Dr. Kelsen starts his analysis by a critique of the doctrinal base of Soviet
legal theory-namely, the Marx-Engels theory of State and law. As almost
everyone knows, the dominant feature in the Marx-Engels theory is the doctrine
of the "withering away" of the State and law. What is not so well known, how-
ever, is what this doctrine really means in practice. According to a celebrated
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passage of Engels, during the transition period of the dictatorship of the pro-
letariat, the interference of State power becomes superfluous in one sphere after
another and soon becomes dormant. "[G]overnment over persons is replaced by
the administration of things and the direction of processes of production. The
State is not 'abolished,' it withers away." I And what was true of the State was
true also of law, which Marx and Engels considered to be a coercive order issued
by the State. Neither Marx nor Engels were legal thinkers and their writings on
State and law show this clearly. Neither had a clear idea of the relationships
between State and law and their theories on the matter were not as clearly
worked out as their later disciples have assumed. Kelsen demonstrates most
lucidly that, despite Marxist deprecation of natural-law doctrine, the philoso-
phy of Marx and Engels was essentially based upon notions of natural law.
Indeed, he goes even further and aptly asserts that "[t]he prediction of a state-
less and lawless society of perfect justice is a utopian prophecy like the Mes-
sianic Kingdom of God, the paradise of the future."2
Marx and Engels spoke of the withering away of State and law as a matter of
speculative theory. It has taken the establishment of the Soviet State to show us
what the disappearance of law means as a practical matter. We can see this most
clearly in the writings of E. B. Pashukanis, the most prominent representative
of Soviet legal theory during the first period of its development. According to
Pashukanis, all law has its basis in the exchange of commodities. The adjust-
ment of controversies arising out of such exchange is seen as the end of law.
Law, says he, will lose its raison d'etre in a society where there are no conflicting
individual interests requiring adjustment. Thus, law will no longer be necessary
in a Socialist society. "Only capitalism creates all the conditions necessary to
enable the judicial element to obtain its highest development in social rela-
tions.'' 3 In the Socialist State, there will be no more law, but merely technical
regulation; legal rules will be replaced by "social-technical" rules. "The wither-
ing away of bourgeois Law can under no circumstances mean its replacement by
some new categories of proletarian Law, but only the withering away of Law in
general, i.e., the gradual disappearance of the juridical element from human
relations."' 4
As Dr. Kelsen aptly points out, the Pashukanis theory is a complete negation
of the concept of law. Nor, under both that theory and the facts of Soviet life, is
the social order divested of its coercive character. Quite the contrary! In
Pashukanis' writings, technical regulation is posited as the substitute for law.
But this is merely another form of Engels' thesis that, with the gradual transi-
tion to a Socialist State, the rule of law over men would be replaced by the mere
1 Engels, Anti-Duehring 309 (Eng. ed., 1942).
2 P. 38.
3Pashukanis, The General Theory of Law and Marxism (1925), quoted in Schlesinger,
Soviet Legal Theory 156 (1945).
4 Ibid.
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administration of things. In terms familiar to us it is obvious that these "social-
technical" rules are identical and coextensive with administrative rules and
regulations-with the acts of executive officials unrestrained by law. A doctrine
of administrative absolutism is to take the place of law in the settlement of dis-
putes. "The more consistently the principle of authoritative regulation, exclud-
ing all references to an independent autonomous will, is carried through, the less
room remains for an application of the category of law." 5 In the State as postu-
lated by Pashukanis, there "is to be no law, and but one rule of law, namely,
that there are no laws, but only administrative orders for the individual case.
Expediency is to be the guide for each item of judicial-administrative action."16
Perhaps the best commentary on Pashukanis' theory of arbitrary executive
power as a substitute for law is to be found in an address by Dean Pound: "The
professor is not with us now. With the setting up of a plan by the present govern-
ment in Russia, a change in doctrine was called for and he did not move fast
enough in his teaching to conform to the doctrinal exigencies of the new order.
If there had been law instead of only administrative orders it might have been
possible for him to lose his job without losing his life.' 7
With the establishment of the Soviet dictatorship upon a more or less per-
manent basis, Soviet writers themselves came to see the inadequacies of a legal
theory that denied the existence of law. By the time of A. Y. Vyshinsky, Soviet
jurists saw the need for working out their system in legal terms and posited the
ideal of so-called Socialist legality. By then, it was all too apparent that, despite
the Marx-Engels dogma, the State was anything but withering away in the
U.S.S.R. And the Soviet Government, like all other governments, sought to
inculcate its citizens with the ideal of legality. Dr. Kelsen well shows how
Vyshinsky's contribution to the theory of the nature of law consists in his
effort to adapt the definition of law to the new doctrine of the State decreed by
his master, Stalin. "A nauseous servility toward the then dictator, an intel-
lectual prostration that surpasses the worst forms of byzantinism, is a character-
istic feature of this legal science, the highest ambition of which is to be a sub-
missive servant of the government." '8
One should not, it is true, minimize the place of law in the present-day Soviet
system. Yet the significant thing about Soviet law is that it is law in the Anglo-
American sense only in the field of private law. The administration of justice in
the U.S.S.R. is still characterized by its essentially dualistic quality. To put it
another way, Soviet law plays a controlling part only in the ordering of the rela-
tions between private citizens. Legal concepts are not applicable to the sphere
of public law, which remains regulated by arbitrary measures in which the
dominant officials exercise discretionary prerogatives. A system of law and a
5 Bodenheimer, Jurisprudence 90 (1940).
6 Pound, Fifty Years of Jurisprudence, 51 Harv. L. Rev. 781 (1938).
7 Pound, Administrative Law 127 (1942).
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system of force exist side by side in such a State. As Professor Berman has put
it, "There are certain areas into which law penetrates only slightly. For ex-
ample, a person who is suspected of antagonism to the regime may be picked up
by the secret police, held incommunicado for a long period of time, tried secretly
by an administrative board, and sentenced to hard labor-without benefit of
defense counsel and without any possibility of appeal. On the other hand, there
are other areas which are on the whole governed by well-defined legal stand-
ards." I The Soviet Union is thus what has aptly been characterized as a dual
State' 0-one in which acts of the administration are placed in a privileged posi-
tion of immunity from control by law. And this, it should be noted, is the cen-
tral feature of all totalitarian States, whether they be of the Soviet or Nazi
variety. Indeed, the very term "dual State" is one which was first used to
describe the authoritarian National Socialist State. But it is certainly accurate
as well to describe the State set up in post-revolutionary Russia. The Soviet,
like the Nazi, State may well be described as being under a more or less per-
manent system of martial law, which, following Blackstone's famous definition,
is "in truth and reality no law," for it "is built upon no settled principles, but is
entirely arbitrary in its decisions.""S BERNARD SCHwARTZ*
9 Berman, Justice in Russia vii-viii (1950).
10 Fraenkel, The Dual State (1941).
n11 BI. Comm. 413 (Cooley's ed., 1866).
* Professor and Director, Institute of Comparative Law, New York University School of
Law.
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Roughly since the late 'teens of the present century, when Albert J. Beveridge
published his monumental four-volume biography of John Marshall, lawyers,
historians and political scientists have been analyzing and criticizing the Su-
preme Court as an institution of American government and the performances of
individual justices. There have been histories of the Court, biographies of indi-
vidual justices, studies of groups of justices, analyses of constitutional doc-
trines and of behavior in particular fields, and various other types of appraisal.
The reasons for so many and such varied studies have included the following:
In our American emphasis on the bigness and betterness of the present and the
future, we have lost something of the halo that once betokened our constitu-
tional system and its institutions, and particularly the Supreme Court. We
have dissipated some of our reverence for the past and institutions hoary with
tradition, with the result that each institution must be continually proving its
case and in terms of prestige can draw but a minimum of sustenance from the
past. The prolonged rift in Court decisions marked by relatively consistent
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